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Abstract
This article reviews the literature on Europeanization beyond the group of EU member,
“quasi-member” and applicant states. It uses the analysis of Europeanization in applicant
states as a theoretical starting point to ask if, how and under which conditions we can expect
domestic effects of European integration beyond Europe. Focusing on Europeanization effects
in the areas of regionalism, democracy and human rights, and the literature on the European
Neighborhood Policy in particular, the article collects findings on the strategies and instru-
ments as well as the impact and effectiveness of the EU. The general conclusion to be drawn
from the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed is one of low consistency and impact.
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1 Introduction
“Europeanization beyond Europe” seems an improbable candidate for a literature review. The
skeptical reader may first ask: “Is there a literature on Europeanization beyond Europe?” The
study of Europeanization is largely confined to the impact of European integration and governance
on the member states of the European Union (EU) (see the Living Reviews by Goetz and Meyer-
Sahling 2008; Ladrech 2009; Treib 2008). A few studies have expanded the scope of Europeanization
analysis to the “quasi-member states,” specifically Norway and Switzerland (e.g., Fischer, Nicolet,
and Sciarini 2002; Lægreid, Steinthorsson, and Thorhallsson 2004; Lavenex and Lehmkuhl 2009;
Mach, Ha¨usermann, and Papadopoulos 2003; Sciarini, Fischer, and Nicolet 2004; Sverdrup and
Kux 2000). Even more recently, the study of Europeanization has begun to include candidate
states for EU membership (see the Living Review by Sedelmeier 2011). But is there any literature
on “Europeanization beyond Europe”, that is, countries that are not eligible for membership in
the foreseeable future? The editors of a 2007 compilation of Europeanization research admit, while
positing that the scope of Europeanization is not conceptually limited to the impact of the EU on
its member states, that their own handbook is no exception from this focus (Vink and Graziano
2007: 9, 12). None of its 25 chapters deal with Europeanization beyond accession countries. In
addition, a title search in any major literature database combining the keyword “Europeanization”
with the names of major countries or continents will yield few useful results, while those found
are likely to be full of “noise” – articles and books that are actually about member and candidate
states or those that use “Europeanization” in a very loose and metaphorical sense with few, if any,
references to the Europeanization literature in political science studies of the EU.
Second and more fundamentally, the skeptical reader may argue that the available literature
fails to mention “Europeanization” for a good reason and ask: “Is there Europeanization beyond
Europe?” It is certainly plausible to assume that EU organizations, policies and decisions have a
relevant domestic impact on member states, quasi-member states that participate in the internal
market and the candidate states that must adopt the acquis communautaire to qualify for mem-
bership. But can the EU also have a systematic and distinctive influence of this kind beyond
Europe?
This is a legitimate question that has triggered my interest for doing this review. What does the
literature tell us about the EU’s goals and instruments in this area? What are the “mechanisms”
of Europeanization beyond the group of actual and would-be members? To what extent and under
which conditions has the EU been effective in Europeanizing countries beyond its membership
region? A practical comparative starting point for answering these questions is found in the
related field of Europeanization of candidate and accession countries (Sedelmeier 2011).
(1) In the case of quasi-members and candidate countries, it is clear that the transfer of the
acquis communautaire is at the core of Europeanization. Participation in the highly regulated
single market requires the adoption of its rules, and EU enlargement has always been based on
the principle that new members must transpose the entire acquis, albeit with varying transition
periods. Beyond the EU, the European Economic Area (EEA), and candidate countries, the
content appears less predetermined. So what is the substance of Europeanization beyond Europe?
Which ideas, norms, rules, organizational structures and procedures, behavioral patterns, etc.,
spread intentionally or unintentionally beyond integrated Europe?
(2) Whereas the EU uses the incentive of membership as the main – and generally effective –
lever to make applicant countries adopt its rules, at least formally, this instrument is not applicable
to countries currently ineligible for EU membership. Which other instruments and strategies does
the EU then have at its disposal? And can these instruments and strategies be successful in the
absence of the membership incentive and the accession conditionalities that often come with it?
(3) Finally, has the EU been able to transfer its rules and practices beyond the confines of its
member and candidate countries? While there is no doubt that a massive transfer of EU rules and
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practices is taking place during the accession phase in countries aspiring to become EU members,
it is far from obvious that countries outside the group of potential member states should be subject
to Europeanization in a similarly pervasive way.
To be sure, the study of EU foreign policy and external relations has become a growth industry
in EU research. But “Europeanization” is rarely mentioned in this literature, let alone featured
in the titles of books and articles. Rather, this literature examines the EU as an international
or global actor or as a civilian or normative power; covers the EU’s foreign or external policy
or policies; or discusses the EU’s relations with various regions of the world. In addition, this
literature focuses on what the EU is in the international system (“actor”, “presence”, or “system”;
“civilian”, “trade” or “normative power”, to name several favored concepts) and what it does in
its external relations (policy decisions, content, instruments and strategies) rather than if and how
it affects third countries. Moreover, to the extent that the literature does study the impact of
the EU, it concentrates primarily on the impact of the EU on the international system (e.g., its
influence on the balance of power) or on specific international regimes such as international climate
or trade policy. What remains is a very small selection of literature studying the domestic impact
of the EU beyond Europe – which is the core of the Europeanization research agenda. This review
will therefore be based to a large extent on this relevant portion of EU external relations literature,
focusing on what we can learn from these works for the study of Europeanization.
The main body of the review includes five further sections: Section 2 introduces theoretical
perspectives for studying Europeanization beyond Europe. Sections 3 – 5 follow the three issues
arising from comparing Europeanization beyond Europe with Europeanization in the accession
states: goals and contents (3); instruments and strategies (4); effectiveness and impact (5). Re-
cently, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) has attracted more scholarly analysis, which will
be the focus of Section 6. The ENP is a framework for all neighbors of the EU that do not have
an explicit membership perspective. It comprises Moldova and Ukraine (and potentially Belarus,
but not Russia), the countries of the Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) as
well as the Northern African and Middle Eastern neighbors. The ENP can be seen as a most-likely
case for Europeanization beyond Europe because it deals with close neighbors, covers a broad
range of policies, and is based on the explicit commitment of the EU to extend its acquis beyond
membership. The few findings that concern other world regions are dealt with in Sections 3, 4,
and 5. In the final Section 7, I draw a few general conclusions on the findings of the literature and
the future research agenda.
2 Theoretical perspectives
In general, the study of Europeanization beyond Europe could benefit from the entire range of
theoretical approaches that have been developed and put forward for analyzing Europeanization
in the member states (for a brief overview, see Bulmer 2007). Here, however, I will limit myself
to theoretical perspectives that have been used recently to analyze Europeanization beyond the
borders of the EU – but mainly with regard to accession countries. All of them specify mechanisms
of EU impact, and the conditions under which they operate and are effective, as building blocks
for a theory of Europeanization.
(1) In their analysis of Europeanization in the accession countries of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004, 2005a) distinguish mechanisms of Europeanization
according to two dimensions. On one hand, Europeanization can be EU-driven or domestically
driven. On the other, it can be driven by institutional logics: the “logic of consequences” or the
“logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1989: 160–162). Whereas the logic of consequences
assumes actors to choose the behavioral option that maximizes their utility under the circum-
stances, the logic of appropriateness stipulates that actors choose the behavior that is appropriate
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according to their social role and the social norms in a given situation. According to the logic
of consequences, Europeanization can be driven by the EU through sanctions and rewards that
alter the cost-benefit calculations of the target state (external incentives model). The impact of
external incentives increases with the size of net benefits and the clarity and credibility of EU con-
ditionality. According to the logic of appropriateness, Europeanization may be induced by social
learning. Target states are persuaded to adopt EU rules if they consider these rules legitimate
and identify with the EU. These mechanisms can be implemented either through intergovernmen-
tal interactions (bargaining or persuasion) or through transnational processes via societal actors
within the target state (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a: 11–12, 18). Finally, according to
the lesson-drawing model, states turn to the EU as a result of dissatisfaction with the domestic
status quo and adopt EU rules if they perceive them as solutions to their problems, either based
on instrumental calculations or the appropriateness of the EU solutions.
(2) In a study on the external dimension of Europeanization in the area of immigration policy,
Lavenex and Uc¸arer (2004) distinguish four modes of EU external governance differing in the extent
to which intentional action of the EU or domestic interest of third countries triggers adaptation
(2004: 420–421). “Unilateral policy emulation” occurs when third countries are convinced of the
superiority of the EU’s rules and adopt them in order to more efficiently solve domestic problems.
“Negative externalities” occurs if non-adaptation would create net costs. However, the presence
of an EU requirement may produce policy transfer on the basis of opportune conditionality if the
requirement meets the interests of the third country, or inopportune conditionality if adaptation
is not in its interest but is compensated by other incentives.
(3) In their study of the impact of the EU on border conflicts, Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2006)
construct a two-by-two table to conceptualize four “pathways of EU impact”. They distinguish
pathways first according to “whether the impact is generated by concrete EU measures or an
effect of integration processes that are not directly influenced by EU actors” (2006: 571). In
addition, the impact can be on concrete policies or have wider social implications. The first
pathway is “compulsory impact” – working with concrete measures, namely carrots and sticks,
on concrete policies. The “connective impact” is established through concrete (mainly financial)
measures establishing and supporting contact between conflicting parties. The other pathways
function indirectly. According to the “enabling impact”, actors in conflict situations strengthen
their influence by linking their political agendas and positions to the EU. Finally, the “constructive
impact” results in a fundamental reconstruction of identities as a result of exposure to European
integration (2006: 572–574).
(4) Bauer, Knill, and Pitschel (2007) use the trichotomy of EU governance modes in regula-
tory policy – compliance, competition and communication (Knill and Lenschow 2005) – to analyze
domestic change in Central and Eastern Europe. Compliance is a coercive mechanism triggered
by legally binding EU rules that national administrations must implement in order to avoid sanc-
tions. Whereas compliance is linked to “positive integration”, i.e., the formal harmonization of
national rules, competition is related to “negative integration”, i.e., the abolition of national barri-
ers distorting the common market. In this mode of governance, the impact of the EU is less direct
and works through market pressures rather than institutional sanctions. “Institutional change is
thus stimulated by the need to improve the functional effectiveness of member states’ institutional
arrangements in comparison to those of other participants within the common market.” (Bauer,
Knill, and Pitschel 2007: 411) Finally, communication is defined as a governance mode that brings
about change as a result of voluntary information exchange and mutual learning between national
policy-makers in EU-sponsored networks. Rather than direct sanctions from the EU or indirect
sanctions from the market, it is the legitimacy of policy models that drives Europeanization.
Obviously, there is considerable overlap between these conceptualizations. The classifications
by Diez et al. (2006) and Bauer et al. (2007) also implicitly distinguish between logics of ac-
tion; in contrast, Lavenex and Uc¸arer (2004) as well as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005a)
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distinguish between direct EU-driven and indirect pathways of Europeanization. Finally, all clas-
sifications emphasize the ability of Europeanization to function through intergovernmental as well
as transnational channels. Table 1 presents an attempt to map this conceptual overlap. It also
shows the vacant fields in the three categorizations for which I suggest additional concepts (for a
simpler version see Schimmelfennig 2010).
Table 1: Mechanisms of EU impact beyond the member-states
Intergovernmental Transnational
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
Logic of
conse-
quences
(1) Conditionality
Intergovernmental
incentives
Compulsory impact
Compliance
(2) Externalization
Competition
Negative externality
(3) Transnational
incentives
Connective impact
(4) Transnational
externalization
Competition
Logic of
appropri-
ateness
(5) Socialization
Intergovernmental
social learning
Constructive impact
Communication
(6) Imitation
Lesson-drawing
Enabling impact
Unilateral emulation
(7) Transnational
socialization
Transnational social
learning
(8) Societal
imitation
Enabling impact
Conditionality and socialization are the two fundamental mechanisms of EU impact that are
compared and contrasted in most of the literature (see, e.g., Coppieters et al. 2004; Kelley 2004;
Kubicek 2003).
Conditionality (1) is based on the direct, sanctioning impact of the EU on the target govern-
ment and subsumes the intergovernmental channel of external incentives, the compulsory impact
and the compliance mode of governance. In the conditionality mode the EU provides non-member
governments with incentives such as financial aid, market access or institutional ties on the con-
dition that they follow the EU’s demands. The effectiveness of this mechanism depends on the
size of the EU’s rewards and the credibility of its conditionality. Credibility results from superior
bargaining power and a consistent application of conditionality, i.e., the EU needs to be less de-
pendent on or interested in the agreement than its partner, and the partner needs to be certain
that it will receive the rewards only when the conditions are met. In addition, target governments
weigh external incentives against domestic costs. Domestic adaptation costs must not be higher
than the international rewards because otherwise a rational target state of conditionality will not
comply (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a: 12–16).
By contrast, socialization (5) comprises all EU efforts to “teach” EU policies – as well as
the ideas and norms behind them – to outsiders, to persuade outsiders that these policies are
appropriate and, as a consequence, to motivate them to adopt EU policies. Socialization subsumes
intergovernmental “social learning”, “constructive impact” and “communication”. Rather than
directly manipulating or indirectly affecting the cost-benefit calculations of external actors, the
EU teaches them the principles and rules of European governance. External actors adopt and
comply with EU rules if they are convinced of their legitimacy and appropriateness and if they
accept the authority of the EU. This is assumed to be more likely to be the case if the external
actors are in a novel and uncertain environment, identify with and aspire to belong to “Europe”.
A process characterized by deliberation and frequent as well as dense contacts between the EU and
external actors is also thought to help. Finally, high resonance of EU governance with domestic
traditions, norms, and practices provides favorable conditions for effective socialization (Checkel
2001: 562–563; Risse 2000: 19).
Living Reviews in European Governance
http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2012-1
Europeanization beyond Europe 9
All other mechanisms of EU impact are best seen as varieties of these two fundamental logics
– varieties that work more indirectly and/or transnationally than conditionality and socialization.
the EU’s conditionality and socialization can be directed at societal actors – parties, firms, in-
terest groups, NGOs or even regional administrations – rather than central governments. In the
“transnational incentive” or, according to Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2006), “connective” mode of
governance, the EU provides these non-state actors with incentives to follow EU rules themselves
and/or to put pressure on their governments to adopt EU rules. Likewise, in the “transnational
socialization” mode of governance, the EU may try to persuade these societal actors of its val-
ues, norms, or policy ideas. Societal actors will then work to disseminate these ideas further
domestically.
Externalization (2 and 4): Conditionality, transnational incentives and transnational social-
ization are similar in one respect – the EU seeks to directly induce non-member actors to adopt
and follow its rules. There are also, however, indirect modes of EU external governance. In this
view the EU is a “presence” (Allen and Smith 1990) rather than an actor in its external relations.
The EU’s impact on third countries is a result of its capacity as an important system of regional
governance and has an indirect (sometimes even unintended or unanticipated) effect on internal
regulations and policies. According to the logic of consequences, internal EU governance may
produce negative externalities towards third country governments and societal actors. External
actors adopt and comply with EU rules because ignoring or violating them would generate net
costs. This “governance by externalization” is most noticeably produced by the EU’s internal
market and competition policies; firms interested in participating in the EU market must follow
the EU’s rules. Countries whose economies are strongly interconnected with the EU make their
internal rules compatible with those of the EU. This is similar to the competition mode of gover-
nance described by Bauer, Knill, and Pitschel (2007) and “negative externalities” (Lavenex and
Uc¸arer 2004). It may affect societal actors, such as firms and business associations, as well as
governments that are induced to alter their own rules and policies in line with those of the EU. In
general, the effects of externalization increase with the market size of the EU and the strength of
its regulatory institutions (Bach and Newman 2007). The larger the EU’s share is in the foreign
trade of a country, and the more binding and centralized the EU’s rules are, the more this country
will be subject to Europeanization pressures.
Imitation (6 and 8): The EU’s processes and policies may provide a model for other regions,
states and societal actors. Here, the logic of appropriateness is at work. Non-member actors
imitate the EU because they recognize EU rules and policies as appropriate solutions to their
own problems. This is in line with “lesson-drawing” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a) or
“deliberate emulation” (Lavenex and Uc¸arer 2004) by governments as well as non-state actors, and
also resembles the “enabling impact” of the EU, which describes the use of EU policies and solutions
by governmental and societal actors to add external legitimacy to their own political agenda (Diez,
Stetter, and Albert 2006: 573). As in the case of socialization, novices in the international system
and states in an uncertain environment are more likely to look for and emulate role models. They
are more likely to select the EU as their model if they identify with the EU, are in close contact
with the EU, and find EU governance to resonate with their prior beliefs and practices.
These mechanisms can also be effectively used to theorize “Europeanization beyond the EU”.
However, none of the studies reviewed above generate high expectations of impact. According to
the analyses in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005b), the EU’s impact in candidate countries
has resulted primarily from the external incentives of accession conditionality rather than social
learning or lesson-drawing. Democratic conditionality ahead of accession negotiations has worked
best when countries had a credible promise of eventual membership and when the domestic power
costs of adopting democratic and human rights norms were low, i.e., did not threaten regime
survival. Acquis conditionality regarding specific EU rules began to have a major effect only after
accession negotiations commenced.
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Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2006) find that the “transformative power of integration” in bor-
der conflicts is strongest when all parties to the conflict are EU members; much weaker when
parties are only associated with the EU; and even negative when the external border of the EU
coincides with the contested border. According to their study, this is not only because of con-
ditionality. Membership, and association to a lesser extent, also increases the legitimacy of EU
positions (enabling impact), support for common activities (connective impact) and exposure to
the constructive impact (Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006: 573–574, 588).
Finally, Bauer, Knill, and Pitschel (2007) also generally expect the potential impact of the
EU to be higher in states with strong prospects for membership than in “unlikely members”.
Again, this not only applies to the governance mode of compliance (conditionality). Whereas the
compliance mode is expected to have no effect in non-candidate countries, both competition and
communication are hypothesized to have at least a limited effect in the long term due to the fact
that non-candidate countries are subject to market pressures generated by the EU and participate
in EU-sponsored policy networks.
3 Goals and contents
In general, the literature follows the thesis of “domestic analogy”. According to this thesis, polities
prefer to have an international environment that is ordered according to their own principles and
procedures. The substantive goals – as well as instruments – thus mirror the fundamental principles
of the EU and European integration (Peters and Wagner 2005: 215–216); Europeanization consists
of “the external projection of internal solutions” (Lavenex 2004: 695).
This general characterization entails various, more specific claims regarding the goals that the
EU pursues globally.
First, the EU is thought to promote its model of regionalism to other regions. Accordingly, it
proposes regional economic and market integration and the establishment of supranational organi-
zations as pathways to peace and welfare in other parts of the world (Bicchi 2006a; Farrell 2007).
The regionalist model is also seen in the tendency of the EU to design its policies for, and conclude
agreements with, regional groupings of countries rather than with individual states.
Second, and perhaps in a more critical perspective, the EU is often assumed to propagate a
“neoliberal” economic model, which reflects the EU’s internal commitment to market-building and
economic liberalization (see, e.g., Hurt 2003, 2004). Others point out, however, that the EU does
not stand for free-market policies as such but for a multilaterally managed “regulatory framework
for liberal markets” according to its own model (Grugel 2004: 616; Woolcock 2005: 396).
Third, the EU promotes constitutional norms such as human rights, the rule of law and democ-
racy in its external relations (e.g., Manners 2002: 240–241). Mirroring the debate surrounding the
economic model advocated by the EU, Crawford (2005: 594, 596) asserts that, in this case, the
EU promotes a rather limited democracy assistance agenda “oriented at challenging state power
and sustaining economic liberalisation rather than extending popular participation and control”,
and thus “consistent with the maintenance of neo-liberal hegemony”. This includes the promotion
of “good governance” (Carbone 2010).
In sum, according to the “domestic analogy”, for the EU as a regionally integrated system of
liberal democracies and market economies, the principles of regionalism, regulated transnational
markets and democratic constitutionalism define the essence of being “European”. “Europeaniza-
tion” then includes promoting regionally integrated liberal democracies beyond its borders. From
a rational perspective, an international environment that mirrors the EU is likely to be in the best
interest of the EU and its member states. It is an environment that they are familiar with – and
know to use to their benefit. This reduces adaptation and information costs and gives them an
advantage over non-EU actors that are less familiar with such an environment (Peters and Wagner
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2005: 216). Others, however, emphasize shared values and norms as well as established routines
and templates of the EU as the source of these goals. Federica Bicchi, for instance, suggests that
EU external policy can “be seen as unreflexive behaviour mirroring the deeply engrained belief
that Europe’s history is a lesson for everybody. Put briefly, [it] is informed, at least partially, by
the idea that ‘our size fits all”’ (Bicchi 2006a: 287). Regional economic integration and liberal
democracy thus represent strong beliefs and universally valid ideas of an effective political order
that are promoted regardless of calculations of benefit and feasibility.
The focus on more general principles of political order in “Europeanization beyond Europe”
may be an artifact of the literature that has indicated a strong interest in the normative content
of EU external policies and the EU as a value-driven actor and “normative power” (e.g., Manners
2002; Lucarelli and Manners 2006; Sjursen 2006a,b). It is, however, in line with the findings
on Europeanization in candidate countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b): Prior to the
accession process proper, the focus on and impact of the EU’s specific acquis rules has been
generally weak. Rather, the EU’s constitutive political norms are prominent.
Yet the focus on regional integration and liberal democracy also raises questions. First of all,
what is understood as distinctly “European” in “Europeanization”? Whereas it may be granted
that regionalism is a unique feature of EU external relations, democracy, human rights and market
economy are Western principles propagated by non-EU Western countries (such as the United
States) and other international organizations (e.g., the Council of Europe or the OECD) as well.
Moreover, the EU itself may have been influenced by broader tendencies and patterns in the in-
ternational system. Take, for instance, the “neoliberal” economic order the EU advocates in its
external relations. In this case the EU is not only part of a larger tendency represented by most
other international economic organizations (Hurt 2004); its own internal economic governance has
changed under the impact of “neoliberalism” as well. By the same token researchers must be
extremely careful in attributing liberal democratic domestic change in third countries to “Euro-
peanization”. The general problem of Europeanization research – that EU influences must be
analytically separated from international non-EU and domestic societal and political influences
– is more difficult the less EU-specific the rules in question and the less dense the institutional
relationship between the EU and a third country are.
Second, the arguments concerning the “domestic analogy” (Peters and Wagner 2005) or the
“ontological quality” of the EU as a “changer of norms” (Manners 2002: 252) clearly fail to
sufficiently take into account the evolution and changes of the EU’s “Europeanization” goals and
strategies over time. Both arguments suggest that, having been a regional organization of liberal
democratic countries from its very beginnings, the EU should also have engaged in promoting
its model from the start. Yet the promotion of regionalism, economic liberalism, human rights
and democracy has only become prominent since the early 1990s (see below). Instead, the global
political changes of the time (the end of the Cold War, the wave of democratization) and the
concomitant institutional enhancement of the EU as an international actor (the Common Foreign
Security Policy (CFSP) established in the Maastricht Treaty) seem to have spurred the explicit
definition and promotion of the EU model beyond Europe (Farrell 2007: 304).
Third, the focus on “nice” and general goals that are officially propagated and intentionally
pursued by the EU may come at the expense of studying more policy-specific, unintended or
even “nasty” domestic consequences of the EU’s presence in the world. As an effect of the EU’s
market power, for instance, producers and legislators in third countries will often be forced to
unilaterally adopt EU product standards. Consequently, we can observe policy- or issue-specific
Europeanization. Moreover, the effects of the protectionist Common Agricultural Policy on the
welfare and societal and political development of less developed countries have arguably been
extensive.
Finally, the focus in the literature on general political principles and constitutional goals should
not obscure the fact that the EU is predominantly a system of issue-specific, technical international
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rules applied to a great variety of policy areas that make up its acquis communautaire (Magen 2007:
364–366). Everyday EU external governance and its impact on third countries is arguably much
more shaped by the issue-specific regimes of the EU. To a large extent, the EU propagates these
rules directly in order to influence the agenda and decision-making of international organizations
and the policy-making and legislative activities of third countries. In addition, however, the sheer
weight of the EU market induces third countries to adapt to or adopt EU rules in order to be able
to participate in it.
In the remainder of the review, I will focus largely on the general political principles pro-actively
advocated and pursued by the EU. Only Section 6.2 on the ENP will deal with sectoral acquis
rules. In the subsequent section the focus will be placed on how the principles have been pursued.
4 Instruments and strategies
The literature is in broad agreement that the 1990s have witnessed a major change in EU external
policies: the establishment of conditionality, in particular political conditionality, as a core instru-
ment. Before the 1990s EU external relations had been notable for their apolitical content and the
principle of not interfering with the domestic systems of third countries. Since the beginning of
the 1990s, however, democracy, human rights and the rule of law have become “essential elements”
in almost all EU agreements with third countries as both an objective and a condition of the in-
stitutionalized relationship. In case of violation, the EU may suspend or terminate the agreement
(Horng 2003). These goals were complemented later by “good governance”.
How did this policy change come about? It would be insufficient to simply attribute political
conditionality via domestic analogy to the constitutional values and norms of the EU, which had
existed before and did not change at the beginning of the 1990s. Outside the EU the changed
external political environment following the wave of democratization in 1989/90 was the major
influence. The wave of democratization not only strengthened the international legitimacy of
liberal democracy but also increased the need to support new and fledgling democracies. This was
complemented by the increasing acceptance in development policy circles that economic aid and
conditionality were insufficient in the absence of political reform and good governance. Inside the
EU the European Parliament was the major driving force. It could use the assent procedure for
treaties with third countries, which had been introduced by the Single European Act (SEA), to
press for political conditionality (Holland 2002: 120; Smith 2001).
EU conditionality is generally described as “positive”. It uses “carrots” rather than “sticks”
– rewards rather than punishment or assistance (Holland 2002: 132; Schimmelfennig 2005; Smith
2001; Youngs 2001a: 192). In spite of the “essential elements” clause, no agreements with third
countries have been suspended or terminated. According to Youngs, “in practice European policy
was in no significant way based on the use of coercive measures”; the EU has shown “no notable
propensity to impose punitive action directly in relation to democratic shortfalls”. “European
policy-makers saw a more positive, incentives-based form of conditionality as more legitimate and
potentially more effective” than the use of sticks (Youngs 2001a: 192). Below the level of treaty
relationships, however, the EU has, in fact, used the “stick”. In several cases financial aid was
withheld, reduced or suspended, and negotiations were delayed (e.g., Nwobike 2005). However,
“there is scant evidence of additional assistance to countries where things are improving” (Smith
2001: 190).
Conditionality is not the only mechanism of Europeanization observed – even in the field
of democracy and human rights promotion. In his study of EU democracy promotion in the
Mediterranean and East Asia, Richard Youngs finds evidence of two rather different strategies:
civil society support and socialization. In addition, he observes that the “profile of EU democracy
assistance funding in the two regions suggested a bottom-up approach, oriented overwhelmingly to
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civil society support, and in particular human rights NGOs” (Youngs 2001a: 192; Youngs 2001b:
362). This is also true for Latin America where the EU has little leverage for using political
conditionality and has sought to develop direct links with civil society actors (Grugel 2004: 612).
On the other hand, Youngs claims that “in light of the limits to positive and negative material
measures, EU strategy was characterized by an aim to develop deeply institutionalized patterns of
dialogue and co-operation as means of socializing political elites into a positive and consensual ad-
herence to democratic norms” (Youngs 2001a: 193). The EU used “generally accepted cooperation
over technical governance issues” in order to indirectly promote good governance and democracy
(Youngs 2001a: 195; 2001b: 363). According to Youngs, the socialization approach is designed
to create opportunities for “imitation and demonstration effects” and starts with very modest ex-
pectations of introducing the vocabulary of democracy into domestic discourse and inducing elites
to, at the very least, publicly support democracy (Youngs 2001b: 359). It is these strategies,
rather than political conditionality, that bear evidence of a distinctive and innovative “European
approach” to democracy promotion and have been “unduly overlooked” (Youngs 2001a: 192, 195).
By contrast, the US approach to democracy promotion has been characterized by more “concrete
intervention” and a “more top-down, politicized . . . assistance” focusing on the “formal procedural
elements of democracy” (Youngs 2001b: 360, 363–364).
Carbone (2010: 21–22) tells a similar story about the promotion of good governance. At first,
the European Community focused conditionality by including good governance as a “fundamental
element” in the Cotonou Agreement with the ACP countries. Since 2003, however, it has broadened
the scope of instruments in favor of dialogue, capacity-building, and positive incentives – not least
in order to distinguish itself from the World Bank.
In sum, the Europeanization strategies identified by Youngs and Carbone in the areas of hu-
man rights, democracy, and good governance promotion match the most important mechanisms
identified in the theoretical literature (see Section 2 above): conditionality, (intergovernmental)
socialization, and direct EU-society links (via transnational socialization and domestic empow-
erment). The next question is whether the literature on Europeanization beyond Europe also
confirms expectations of weak impact.
5 Impact and effectiveness
What impact has EU external governance had beyond member and candidate states? How and
to what extent has the EU been able to Europeanize non-European countries and regions? In
reviewing the literature I will again focus on regionalism and democracy/human rights. The
two criteria for evaluating EU policy most frequently found in the literature are consistency and
effectiveness.
5.1 Regionalism
According to Bicchi (2006a: 287–288), the EU has consistently promoted regionalism and followed
a regional approach in its agreements and relations with non-European third countries around
the world – with the exception of EU-US bilateral relations. This rather consistent approach
across time and space and in spite of regional divergences strongly indicates that the EU follows
an organizational norm rather than functional considerations. This is particularly evident with
regard to regional policies addressing “regions” that have few objective regional characteristics
(such as high density of transactions) and do not perceive themselves as regional communities –
such as the “Mediterranean” or the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries. Rather, they
constitute “regions” mainly according to EU policy (Bicchi 2006a: 288).
As Grugel (2004) argues in a comparative analysis of EU and US policy vis-a`-vis Latin Amer-
ica, this regionalism is also distinctively European. First, relations are discursively constructed
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as “inter-regional partnerships”, “based around notions of equity and cooperation that ignores or
transcends the underlying power inequalities” (2004: 607–608). Second, the EU “has developed
a conscious political leg to its new regionalism”, distinct from US-sponsored free-trade associa-
tions, built around “the promotion of its own model of democracy, social welfare, and regional
integration”, understood as subregional integration within Latin America (Grugel 2004: 616).
If the EU’s promotion of regionalism has been consistent and distinctive, has it been isomorphic
as well? That is, have regional arrangements created and supported by the EU been modeled on
the EU example and have they been similar to each other? The great variety of interregional
cooperation arrangements seems to contradict the expectation of isomorphism (for an overview,
see Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger 2005). In addition, there appears to be disagreement as far as
the assessment of specific arrangements is concerned. For instance, whereas Bicchi argues that the
institutional settings and governance regimes of the EU and its Mediterranean policy (EMP) are
highly similar to international governance with regard to its multilateral institutional framework,
the emphasis on “economic matters but with a social flavour”, and the “eurocentric” transfer of
the Justice and Home Affairs agenda to the EMP (Bicchi 2006a: 295–298; Joffe´ 2001; Alecu de
Flers and Regelsberger 2005: 323) point to the fact that the Barcelona process has been modeled
on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) rather than the EU.
In addition, the instruments and mechanisms of promoting regionalism vary across regions and
time. The literature suggests that imitation was the dominant mechanism world-wide before the
1990s and has continued to be relevant to this day in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Since the
1990s, however, the EU has turned to more direct promotion of regionalism, that is, imitation
is accompanied by socialization. In its immediate neighborhood and in relations with the ACP
countries, it uses conditionality, too.
The EU did not directly encourage or induce the establishment of major regional organizations
such as the Andean Community and Mercosur in Latin America, ASEAN in Southeast Asia, or
the African Union. Nor have these organizations and their reforms been a response to critical
interdependence with the EU. But all of them have emulated EU institutions and policies. The
uncertainty of the emulators and the legitimacy of the EU appear to be the main conditions for
the imitation of EU institutions. Embracing the apparently successful EU model is perceived as
a way to overcome crises of multilateral cooperation and integration in the regions. For instance,
the Andean Pact was founded in 1969 as a response to the deficiencies of the Latin American Free
Trade Association. To correct for its failures, the founders of the Pact leapfrogged towards the
Community model of supranational integration including, among other features, majority voting,
legal integration with a Court and the direct applicability and supremacy of supranational law,
and – later on – a directly elected Andean Parliament (Malamud and de Sousa 2007: 93–94). Sim-
ilarly, ASEAN reacted to its shortcomings in dealing with the financial crisis of 1997 and related
problems by questioning its decidedly non-European “ASEAN way” of informal, consensual inter-
governmental consultation and cooperation and of eschewing supranational economic integration.
In the aftermath of this crisis, ASEAN policy-makers perceived the need for stronger formalization
and institutionalization as well as more economic integration and started a process that eventually
led to the adoption of a charter in 2005. In this process, the EU served as a source of inspiration
for the constitutional structure as well as the project of a single market (Hwee 2008: 91–92; Bo¨rzel
and Risse 2009: 13–15).
In the meantime, the EU has established institutionalized relationships, funds cooperation
programs, and maintains a political dialogue with these regional organizations so that an element
of socialization is involved alongside imitation (Bo¨rzel and Risse 2009). In Latin America, for
instance, the EU seeks to spread its ideas of regional integration and good governance through
“research funding, seminar programmes, and the creation of a fund to provide for the regular
exchange of ideas [. . . ] in imitation of its own policies” (Grugel 2004: 612).
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As described by the notion of “decoupling” in the neo-institutionalist sociology of organizations
(Meyer and Rowan 1977), the emulated formal structures as responses to crisis and uncertainty
were, however, either never truly implemented or co-existed with practices reflecting “old habits”.
The first option is most clearly seen in the Andean Community, whereas the second seems typical
for the tendency of the member states of ASEAN to retain the practices of sovereignty, informality,
and intergovernmentalism (Hwee 2008: 97–98). At any rate, mimicry in formal appearance and
emulation of actual practice need to be distinguished. In particular, the EU remains unique with
regard to supranational integration, i.e., the pooling and delegation of sovereignty. For this reason,
many institutions that bear the same name in other regional organizations – Commission, Council,
Court, Committee of Permanent Representatives, or Parliament – perform different functions. The
most striking example of decoupling is the African Union. Whereas the former Organization of
African Unity (OAU) not only adapted the EU’s name but also its supranational institutions and
policy programs (such as monetary union), its practices could not be more different from the EU’s
(Farrell 2007: 312).
Unintended effects of the EU’s presence – rather than effects of intentional promotion of region-
alism – seem to have occurred in other regions and sub-regions as well. Hill and Smith (2005: 396)
point out that “the need to deal with a rich and powerful EU draws other states into cooperative
ventures, especially in their international relations” (their italics) and list the South African De-
velopment Committee as well as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) as examples. Although the EU
might have unintentionally triggered regional cooperation in these cases, the cooperation schemes
did not follow the EU model of regionalism.
Both Christiansen, Petto, and Tonra (2000) and Myrjord (2003) refer to the ambivalent effects
of the EU on regional institutions and region-building in adjacent regions. In general, the differen-
tiation among third countries according to how well they meet conditions, which is inherent in EU
conditionality, undermines region-building and strengthens bilateralism in relations between the
EU and its neighbors. In principle, the EU’s neighborhood policies have been designed to reduce
the divisive effects of enlargement and “minimized the importance of the institutional boundary
between the Union and its environment” (Myrjord 2003: 251). They represent “a turn towards an
inclusive form of conducting EU external policy” and give non-member countries a say in EU policy-
making (Myrjord 2003: 251; see also Christiansen, Petto, and Tonra 2000: 412). However, the
often bilateral framework of negotiations between the EU and third states tends to undermine the
model of multilateral regional integration that the EU seeks to promote, and external governance
arrangements can only partially offset the disruptive effects of the EU’s differentiation between
members, candidates and non-candidates in neighboring regions (Christiansen, Petto, and Tonra
2000: 407, 412; Bicchi 2010: 219). These findings are supported in the study by Diez, Stetter,
and Albert (2006), which claims that EU borders that adjoin existing border conflicts exacerbate
rather than mitigate these conflicts. In addition, “an emerging dependence on relatively strong EU
financial instruments carries the potential of crowding out existing regional initiatives” (Myrjord
2003: 252). This effect will, of course, depend on the existence and strength of endogenous region-
building developments. Whereas the EU may have had an overall disruptive effect in the Baltic
and Nordic regions, where such region-building efforts seem to have been relatively well developed,
“even the limited efforts of the EU to generate multilateralism constitute the main driving force
in an externally directed region-building effort” (Christiansen, Petto, and Tonra 2000: 412) in the
Mediterranean.
With regard to Africa, Hurt (2003: 173) is equally skeptical: “The history of regional inte-
gration projects within the ACP group, especially in Africa, is one of consistent failure to achieve
meaningful integration and development.” Moreover, the six new regions defined in the Cotonou
Agreement1 of 2002 are “externally imposed and do not in most cases correspond to existing re-
1 The Cotonou Agreement replaced the Lome´ Convention as the general treaty framework between the EU and
the group of African, Caribbean, and Pacific states. Its focus is on development policy.
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gional organizations”. Other authors conclude that the EU even “threatened existing regional
integration processes” in the region (Slocum-Bradley and Bradley 2010: 40).
In sum, the promotion of regionalism has indeed been a consistent and distinctive feature of EU
external relations. The presence of the EU, its success in regional integration and its importance
as an economic actor have served as models and triggered regional cooperation schemes in other
parts of the world. Both conditionality and lesson-drawing/imitation seem to have been at work in
these processes. Yet the scope and design of these schemes are extremely diverse and bear, at best,
superficial resemblance to the EU. In addition, the actual policy of the EU toward and in these
regional arrangements seems at times to undermine rather than strengthen regionalism beyond the
EU.
5.2 Human rights and democracy
Just as Bicchi (2006a) in the case of regionalism, Bo¨rzel and Risse (2004: 2) argue that “the
instruments used by the EU to promote democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and ‘good
governance’ look surprisingly similar across the globe”, indicating that “the EU follows quite
clearly a specific cultural script”. The use of political conditionality, political dialogue and capacity-
building mechanisms in all world regions demonstrate movement “towards a coherent approach”,
which did not follow a grand design but “incremental ‘learning by doing” (2004: 28–29). However,
Bo¨rzel and Risse avowedly fail to analyze the implementation of the EU’s approach, as well as its
effectiveness on the ground. The picture of consistency quickly becomes blurred when this is taken
into account.
The consistency of EU political conditionality is a central issue addressed in the literature, and
the general conclusion is that it is negative. Inconsistency starts with the fact that “essential-
elements” clauses are not included in agreements with China and the ASEAN countries, nor with
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. While this may be attributed to the presence of a stable
democracy in the latter cases, this justification clearly does not apply to the Asian countries.
Authors generally recognize that the EU treats countries differently regardless of similarities
in human rights records. Despite the pervasive political and legal rhetoric of democracy and
human rights promotion, actual policy seems to match rhetoric only when consistency is “cheap”;
otherwise, it is driven by a host of other geopolitical, economic or security interests. According to
Smith (2001: 193), “poor, marginal states (often in Africa) of little importance to the EU or one
of its member states tend to be subjected to negative conditionality; these are the cases where it is
easiest to show that you are doing something about human rights”. In other cases member states
block suspension or termination because this would harm commercial interests, because the country
is strategically or politically too important or because they have doubts about the effectiveness of
negative measures (2001: 196). Selective positive incentives to promote good governance have also
been hampered by the tendency of member states to protect their close partners from differential
treatment (Carbone 2010: 25).
Overriding interest in cooperation on energy issues and the war on terror is also cited as the
main reason why democracy promotion was not prioritized in Central Asia, despite the dismal
political record of the region (Warkotsch 2006). In a comparative analysis of EU responses to
violations of democratic norms in the post-Soviet area, Warkotsch (2008) further shows that, while
the existence of a democracy clause in EU-third country agreements significantly increases the
likelihood of an EU response to anti-democratic policies, it is not significantly correlated with
responses that go beyond verbal denunciation. By contrast, stronger sanctions are more likely to
be used against geographically proximate states and less likely against resource-rich countries.
Holland (2002: 133) reports that suspensions have mainly hit participants in the Lome´ Con-
vention and countries that were economically relatively unimportant to the EU; on the other hand,
the EU spared Asian and economically more relevant countries. In conclusion he argues that while
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the “link between development and democratic principles of good government has become the
accepted and inevitable face of North-South relations; the degree to which this conditionality is
supervised and sanctioned remains variable, almost idiosyncratic” (Holland 2002: 135).
Youngs (2001b: 357) also generally finds that the “the overall distribution of EU trade and aid
provisions did not to any significant extent correlate with democratic criteria” and punishment as
well as rewards “were adopted on an ad hoc basis and not pursued with any coherence or vigour”.
He also observes that the EU has reacted more to massive human rights abuses and “dramatic
interruptions of the democratic process” than to persistently autocratic governments. “Democratic
conditionality has not been systematic.” (Youngs 2001b: 356)
In a statistical analysis of the suspension of development cooperation in reaction to human rights
violations, Hazelzet (2005) comes to more nuanced results. She finds that “the level of respect for
human rights or regime type was not significant for the granting of EU development cooperation”
and that the EU was less likely “to impose sanctions on countries with which it has institutionalised
cooperation”, which confirm the general picture of inconsistency (2005: 9–10). But she also finds
that former French and British colonies were sanctioned less severely than former colonies of other
EU member states, indicating the protective influence of France and Britain (2005: 10). On the
whole, however, her multivariate regression analysis “indicates that, in the 1990s, overall the level
of human rights violations was a more important determinant for EU sanctions than the level of
economic or strategic importance of a country” (Hazelzet 2005: 11). In the end, Hazelzet’s findings
refer only to ACP countries. As other authors have pointed out (see above), this group of countries
was of relatively minor economic and strategic importance to the EU and was thus more likely to
be treated consistently than Asian countries.
This inconsistency differs markedly from the fairly consistent and meritocratic use of political
conditionality vis-a`-vis the accession countries (see, e.g., Schimmelfennig 2003: 99–108; Vachudova´
2005). The variation in institutional set-up may be one cause for this discrepancy. In the accession
cases political assessments and decisions are prepared by the Commission in a centralized manner;
beyond applicant countries, governments of member state and the various pillars of the EU are
more strongly involved (Smith 2001; Youngs 2001a: 28–46). Alternatively, the difference can
be explained by a “community effect: when constitutional questions such as membership are at
stake, the pressure to act in line with the constitutive community rules increases. Rule adoption
is expedient for outside cooperation partners but indispensable for future members. Whereas
interest-based considerations are permitted to take the upper hand in relations with external states,
the constitutive community rules will prevail in relations with future insiders” (Schimmelfennig,
Engert, and Knobel 2006: 46).
Beyond Europe, the move toward intergovernmental political conditionality seems thus to have
been a declaratory rather than practical policy. If the EU’s political conditionality approach has
been inconsistent in countries and regions beyond Europe, what about its policies of domestic
empowerment and socialization? According to Richard Youngs, the EU did not pursue these
strategies consistently either. As to civil society assistance, “the EU did not push hard to gain
access for political aid work” and was “unwilling to risk tension with recipient governments”. In its
dialogue and cooperation “the EU often deliberately sought ways of circumventing its own formal
preconditions, offering concrete sectoral cooperation without the need for a formalization of new
democracy-based discourse” (Youngs 2001a: 193; see also Youngs 2001b: 365). It seems thus to
be a general feature of EU democracy promotion that it has been, as several authors have put it,
“high on rhetoric and low on policy” (Crawford 2005 on Ghana; Warkotsch 2006 on Central Asia).
Elsewhere, Youngs uses the case of EU human rights promotion in order to make a general
point about the interaction of norms and strategic interests in EU external relations. He argues
that “instrumental choices are made within a range of common normative understandings” and, in
particular, that “security-driven choices [have] been selected within the overarching human rights
framework” (Youngs 2004: 431). In his analysis EU human rights policy has been attuned to the
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general promotion of international stability and exhibited a “state-oriented capacity-building bias”
(Youngs 2004: 424).
There is broad agreement in the literature not only on the overall inconsistency of EU strategy,
but also on the overall low impact of the EU on democracy and human rights in non-candidate
third countries. These findings hold regardless of the region under study and strategy used. The
causes of ineffectiveness appear rather overdetermined for political conditionality. First, vis-a`-vis
non-candidate countries, the EU cannot use its most important incentive for compliance – the
prospect of membership. Second, inconsistency hampers effectiveness: the “seemingly variable
application of conditionality . . . detracts from the EU’s international credibility and influence”
(Holland 2002: 135). Third, for the predominantly authoritarian or autocratic governments in
the EU’s neighboring regions, compliance with the EU’s democratic or human rights standards is
politically costly. It involves the risks of losing political power that, in the perception of third-
country governments, are not offset by the economic or diplomatic rewards the EU has on offer. The
indirect strategies were confronted with the same obstacle when the ruling elites in target states
“perceived that the good governance agenda was elaborated with increasingly political intent”
(Youngs 2001a: 195; see also Tanner 2004: 140–141).
To conclude, EU democracy promotion and human rights policy beyond Europe has used the
three mechanisms of conditionality, socialization and domestic empowerment. In all of these cases,
however, EU policy in third countries and regions has been characterized by low consistency and
effectiveness. In the next Section 6, I will review the more recent and specialized literature on the
European Neighborhood Policy in order to find if the general findings hold true there as well.
6 European Neighborhood Policy
The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was introduced by the EU during the time of its
“big bang” enlargement of 2004 in order to expand and strengthen its relationship with neigh-
boring countries that would not be considered as candidates for membership – at least for the
foreseeable future. Originally conceived to encompass the enlarged EU’s Eastern European neigh-
bors, it was later extended to the Middle Eastern and North African partner countries of the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (“Barcelona Process”) and further to the Caucasus. It excludes
Russia, however, which insisted on pursuing a separate track of cooperation with the EU (see, e.g.,
Johansson-Nogue´s 2007 for an overview of the history of ENP).
The ENP can easily be seen as a framework of Europeanization. It was designed by Commission
officials who had previously been in charge of enlargement and applied previously acquired tools
to their new positions (Kelley 2006). It was originally planned to mirror the EEA by extending
the EU market and acquis in the absence of formal membership in EU organizations. In addition,
three principles of enlargement policy appeared in the ENP documents: First, the ENP is based on
the EU’s commitment to promote core liberal values and norms beyond its borders and, second, it
claims to use political conditionality as the main instrument of norm promotion. “Differentiation”
is a fundamental principle of the ENP. In the absence of the membership incentive, the ENP
strategy documents tie both participation in the ENP as such and the intensity and level of
cooperation to the ENP partners’ adherence to liberal values and norms (Maier and Schimmelfennig
2007: 40–42). Third, the EU uses planning, reporting and assistance procedures similar to that
used for candidate countries (Baracani 2009: 136–137).
There are clear differences to enlargement, however, beyond the obvious fact that the ENP is
not designed to guide third countries toward membership. For one, the major incentives designed
to induce Europeanization in ENP countries – a liberalized access of goods and persons to the EU
– is likely to be undermined by protectionist interest groups in the EU, the exclusion of sectors
such as agriculture in which the ENP partners have a competitive edge and fears of crime and
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uncontrolled immigration in the EU (Occhipinti 2007; Sedelmeier 2007: 201–205; Vachudova´ 2007.
Based on case studies dealing with different sub-regions of the ENP, the editors of a recent edited
volume conclude that “the far reaching-benefits on offer have remained in the realm of possibilities”
and too vague and weak to wield substantial leverage and encourage painful and costly reforms
(Whitman and Wolff 2010: 12–13).
Second, rather than full transposition of the acquis, the EU’s “expectation is for partial and
progressive alignment with EU legal norms in areas where it makes economic sense, suits the devel-
opment level and serves the development goals of the neighbours” (Noutcheva and Emerson 2007:
91). Moreover, the EU “puts a much stronger emphasis on ‘soft’ and participatory mechanisms
involving the ENP partners” (Sedelmeier 2007: 199). Rather than unilaterally imposed by the
EU based on its acquis, the Action Plans at the core of ENP programming are negotiated and
monitored between the EU and its partners bilaterally and based on “joint ownership”.
Joint ownership, a core principle of the socialization mechanism of Europeanization, is con-
sidered to undermine the effectiveness of conditionality. On one hand, “it reduces the likelihood
that bilateral Action Plans reflect the EU’s objective precisely in relations with those countries
which are furthest from conforming to the conditions preferred by the EU” (Sedelmeier 2007: 200).
Governments that do not share the EU’s democracy and human rights agenda, for instance, can
and do minimize the role of political conditionality in their Action Plans. On the other, it is
“at odds with the tough monitoring and reporting by EU institutions that was a precondition for
reform-oriented forces to mobilize pressure against reform-adverse governments in East Central
European accession governments” (ibid.). To summarize, Sedelmeier expects the coexistence of
conditionality and socialization in the ENP to “undermine their respective potential” (2007: 201).
By contrast, Sasse (2008, 2010) finds merit and opportunities in the ENP’s “conditionality-lite”.
While she agrees that it is unlikely to produce short-term EU-driven change at the level of third
country governments, ENP conditionality may serve as an external reference point for longer-term
domestic political processes. In her view the vagueness of conditions and incentives “makes it
easier for traditionally Euro-sceptic actors in ENP countries to approach the EU gradually and
selectively” (Sasse 2008: 298).
6.1 Democracy promotion in the ENP
The expectation of (at least short-term) ineffectiveness is borne out by the preliminary evidence
published so far (see also Bo¨rzel 2011). An analysis of ENP participants’ democracy and human
rights records since they established contractual relations with the EU in the mid-1990s shows
that the EU has neither consistently linked its cooperation agreements with the political situation
in these countries, nor have these countries liberalized as a result of EU political conditionality
(Maier and Schimmelfennig 2007: 45–48). Comparisons of ENP Action Plans confirm the absence
of a coherent democracy promotion policy and the overriding importance of the EU’s geostrategic
and partner countries’ political interests (Bosse 2007; Baracani 2009). Even in a comparatively
benign case such as Ukraine, in which the EU made clear and determinate demands on one of
the most liberalized and pluralistic ENP countries, Gawrich, Melnykovska, and Schweikert (2010)
argue that the effectiveness of EU top-down democracy promotion has been weak in the absence
of a membership perspective.
Studies of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean confirm this overall assessment.
First, the conditions and benchmarks for differentiation and conditionality are described as vague,
arbitrary, inconsistent, incomplete (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2011). The EU’s consistent ap-
plication of political conditionality in this region is further undermined by its efforts to build a
multilateral partnership in the Southern Mediterranean and to promote peace in the Middle East –
otherwise it would risk losing essential partners for these efforts. At the end of the day, the EU, and
particularly its southern member states, have preferred stable, authoritarian and Western-oriented
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regimes to the instability and Islamist electoral victories that genuine democratization processes in
this region are likely to produce (Gillespie and Whitehead 2002: 196; Gillespie and Youngs 2002:
12–13; Youngs 2002: 42; Ju¨nemann 2003: 7). It remains to be seen if and which way the “Arab
spring” will change this picture.
The EU’s socialization efforts have been limited by the same security and stability concerns.
Though EU democracy assistance has been institutionally and financially strengthened, it has
remained modest in scale. In addition, it used to be primarily directed towards secular civil
society organizations engaged in non-political services that are approved by, and often connected
to, partner governments (Gillespie and Whitehead 2002: 197; Haddadi 2002, 2003; Ju¨nemann
2002; Youngs 2002: 55–57). These assessments stem from the pre-ENP period but have been
confirmed by more recent studies (Pace 2009; Pace, Seeberg, and Cavatorta 2009: 4–5; Youngs
2008). In addition to the lack of political will, Bicchi (2006b) points out that implementation
problems such as a long chain of command and ambiguous and contested policy objectives add to
the ineffectiveness of EU democratic assistance.
From a theoretical perspective, the failure of democracy in the ENP is overdetermined. Con-
ditionality is undermined by limited incentives, weak credibility and high adaptation costs for the
mostly autocratic regimes in the region. Socialization suffers from weak norm resonance in the
target countries but also from the EU’s readiness to sacrifice its democratic and human rights
norms in the interest of stability.
Given the limits and failures of top-down political conditionality and bottom-up socialization
in the context of the ENP, Sandra Lavenex, Frank Schimmelfennig and their collaborators have
begun to examine an alternative model of democracy promotion in the European Neighborhood
(Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011). The “governance model” starts with the assumption that
the intensifying web of association relations between the EU and associated third countries intro-
duces a new form of democracy promotion through sectoral cooperation. Democratic governance
goes beyond “good governance” in that it includes general attributes of democracy such as ac-
countability, transparency and participation. It differs from the direct promotion of democracy
in that it does not target the general institutions and processes of the polity, such as elections,
parties, or parliaments, but operates at the level of sectoral policy-making. The EU seeks not
only to externalize its material acquis rules for regulating public policy in each sector of political
cooperation between the EU and its neighboring countries, but also procedural rules on how sec-
toral policies and actors are made transparent, accountable and participatory. Though democratic
governance promotion initially remains at the sectoral level and – in the case of success – leads to
the democratization of sectoral governance, it may spill over into the general polity by inculcating
democratic values, norms and habits on societal and bureaucratic actors and creating a demand
for far-reaching democratization of the entire political system (Freyburg et al. 2007, 2009a).
In an empirical assessment comparing democratic governance promotion in three sectors (asy-
lum, competition and environmental policy) and four countries (Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, and
Ukraine), Freyburg et al. show that the EU is, indeed, capable of inducing neighbouring countries
to incorporate policy-specific democratic governance provisions into domestic legislation in the ab-
sence of accession conditionality or even membership aspirations. This is especially the case when
the corresponding EU rules are strongly codified and institutionalized, interdependence favors the
EU, and domestic adaptation costs are low. The study also shows, however, that the application
of these provisions in administrative practice has remained weak thus far (Freyburg et al. 2009b,
2011). In a different set of studies, Freyburg (2011a,b) shows that functional cooperation between
the EU and ENP countries has the potential to transfer and strengthen positive attitudes of state
officials towards democratic governance.
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6.2 External governance beyond democracy promotion
Democracy promotion is the most widely studied area of Europeanization in the European Neigh-
borhood. Studies focusing on other EU rules and policies remain relatively scarce. As in democracy
promotion, the available evidence points to systematic weaknesses in EU impact. At a general level,
Noutcheva and Emerson (2007: 90) show on the basis of World Bank governance scores that “most
of them have regressed rather than progressed on both regulatory quality and rule of law” between
1996 and 2004, i.e., during the time that the EU established institutionalized and – at least on
paper – politically conditioned relations with the neighborhood countries.
Comparative analyses across policies and countries point to the relevance of EU rewards and
bargaining power as well as domestic adaptation benefits and costs for explaining Europeanization
effects. In his book on EU external energy policy, Hofer (2008) compares EU rule export in Bul-
garia, Serbia and Ukraine. For one, successful EU rule transfer requires that there be an economic
necessity for reform in the country. In addition, however, the EU needs to apply proactive accession
conditionality in order to overcome domestic interest group opposition. The absence of this second
condition explains why EU influence in Ukraine has been weak in comparison with Bulgaria and
Serbia (see also Gawrich et al. 2010). In this sector, however, ineffectiveness may be the result of
more than simple reluctance of the EU to provide a membership incentive and active monitoring.
As Adam Stulberg and Sandra Lavenex point out, the policy field of energy “constitutes a rare
set of issues of rough parity between Brussels and ENP partners” with mutual vulnerabilities and
complementary interests (Stulberg and Lavenex 2007: 137) so that the EU would not have the
bargaining power to impose its energy policy rules on ENP countries unilaterally.
EU rewards and bargaining power are also highlighted as a crucial condition of effective rule
transfer in other studies. Barbe´, Costa, Herranz Surralle´s, and Natorski (2009) ask whose rules
the EU and selected neighboring countries (Georgia, Morocco, Russia and Ukraine) choose for
negotiations on foreign and security policy cooperation. They show that EU rules are by no
means the focal point of cooperation and are no more prominent than other international rules
or bilaterally negotiated new rules. Only those countries that harbor hopes of eventual accession
are, on the whole, willing to adopt EU rules. This is why they perceive EU rules as legitimate.
Otherwise, third countries will only orient themselves to EU rules if interdependence with the EU
and EU bargaining power are high. Dimitrova and Dragneva (2009) emphasize the limits on the
Europeanization of Ukraine imposed by Russia. In a comparison of trade, energy and foreign policy
relations, they show that the effectiveness of EU rule export increases with Ukrainian dependence
on the EU instead of Russia. Wunderlich (2010) argues that convergence on migration policy
between the EU and Morocco was limited because the EU depends on the partner countries for its
implementation – thus limiting EU bargaining power. Policy convergence could only be achieved
at the cost of considerable concessions by the EU, leading in effect to a softening of EU rules and a`
la carte cooperation by the partners. Finally, Gawrich, Melnykovska, and Schweikert (2010) show
(for Ukraine) that tangible rewards such as the granting of market status and help with WTO
accession are effective tools of conditionality that can compensate for divergent interests and the
absence of a membership perspective to some extent. EU bargaining power is also highlighted as
a crucial condition of effective rule transfer in two other studies.
In many respects the ENP can be considered the most likely context for Europeanization beyond
the group of member, quasi-member and candidate countries of the EU. It is here that international
interdependence with the EU and the EU’s efforts to expand its acquis are stronger than in other
regions of the world. Nevertheless, studies of the neighborhood policies overwhelmingly show that
the ENP is inconsistent – both with regard to the expansion of the acquis rules and the use of
conditionality – and is ineffective. Neighborhood countries appear to be willing to adopt EU rules
only if they hope to be considered for full membership in the future and to the extent that the
EU possesses superior bargaining power vis-a`-vis partner countries and alternative governance
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providers such as Russia. Both conditions are the exception rather than the rule in the European
Neighborhood.
Therefore, in their study of EU external governance in the area of internal security, Lavenex
and Wichmann (2009) start with the assumption that socialization through “network governance”,
rather than hierarchical policy transfer through conditionality, is more likely to be used and effec-
tive in EU-neighborhood relations. Though they find abundant evidence of the existence of such
transgovernmental networks, they also come to the conclusion that the operation and effectiveness
of these networks is hampered by incompatible administrative structures, cultures, expertise and
lack of trust.
The findings on the ENP apply a fortiori to the Russian district of Kaliningrad, which has
also recently been analyzed from a Europeanization perspective (Ga¨nzle, Mu¨ntel, and Vinokurov
2008). Although relations between the EU and Kaliningrad are not formally part of the ENP, as an
exclave surrounded by EU territory, Kaliningrad was designed to be a “pilot region” for enhanced
EU-Russia relations. In spite of this particular geographic situation and the interdependence that
comes with it, Europeanization has remained very weak and selective (Ga¨nzle and Mu¨nter 2008).
Generally, the low level of regional autonomy, and Russia’s insistence on safeguarding sovereignty
and being treated as a special partner (Meloni 2008), limit the impact of EU rules. But “weak
institutional capabilities and lack of interest” prevent Europeanization even in policy areas with
comparatively high regional autonomy (Ga¨nzle and Mu¨nter 2008: 251).
7 Conclusions
In the introductory sections of the review, I proposed to use the literature on Europeanization
in candidate states for membership as a benchmark for the analysis of “Europeanization beyond
Europe”. In general, the findings reported here suggest that the dividing line between candidate
states and other third countries also constitutes a categorical difference for the analysis of the
effects of Europeanization.
First, though the acquis communautaire is at the core of Europeanization in the case of “quasi-
members” and candidate countries, the goals and contents of Europeanization beyond Europe
– at least those analyzed in the majority of the literature – are of a more general character.
“Regionalism” may still count as an EU-specific goal, which, if effectively pursued, would result
in a distinctive “Europeanization” beyond Europe, other core goals such as stability and security
or democracy and human rights are clearly less related to the EU’s acquis and less specific to the
EU’s external relations. However, there is a clear tendency in more recent literature on the ENP
to redress the balance in favor of the whole range of EU policies.
Second, even though positive political conditionality became a general feature of EU relations
with third countries in the 1990s, it has been used less consistently than in EU relations with
potential member states. Moreover, other instruments for promoting EU core values and norms
– such as domestic empowerment of civil society or socialization through transgovernmental co-
operation – do not appear to have been consistent and effective substitutes for political accession
conditionality, even if they were described as unique EU strategies.
Third, the Europeanizing impact of these strategies has been weak beyond the group of credible
candidates for EU membership. The causes for weak impact are probably manifold: low incentives
and low consistency of policy on the part of the EU, and serious domestic obstacles to Europeaniza-
tion on the part of third countries. In sum, membership, or the prospect or hope of membership,
appears to be a crucial condition of Europeanization. With regard to its specific normative and
regulatory content and its instruments and its impact, Europeanization beyond Europe is substan-
tially weaker than Europeanization in Europe. This, however, need not be the last word on the
issue.
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1) The literature conveys the picture that Europeanization efforts beyond Europe are inconsis-
tent and ineffective overall, but this does not mean that there are no cases of consistent policy and
effective impact. Searching for such cases and studying their conditions in comparison with similar
cases may generate better knowledge of the differential effects and the conditions of Europeaniza-
tion in non-candidate countries. In general, we need further carefully designed and theory-guided
comparative studies that directly address and assess the causality question between EU policies
and domestic change.
2) Though most Europeanization literature focuses very much on policies, policy-making pro-
cesses and administrative structures, the literature reviewed here was mainly about polity: regional
integration and constitutional structure. Studies mirroring the general focus on policy and politics
related to policy-making might well find a stronger impact of “Europe” on third countries. The
few studies on the impact of EU external governance in the European Neighborhood mentioned
above confirm this expectation. Even though it is far from the common and systematic impact of
accession negotiations on candidate countries, the ENP does produce selective rule export – above
all where EU bargaining power is high and third countries harbor hopes of being considered for
accession in the future. More work of this kind is needed.
Finally, the growing body of empirical research on EU external governance and Europeaniza-
tion calls for systematic comparison and theoretical synthesis. Lavenex (2011) proposes a typology
of EU external governance arrangements with non-member states based on the scope, legal qual-
ity, and monitoring of EU rules and the organizational form of EU-third country relations. In
line with the metaphor of “concentric circles”, she shows that intensity of regulatory and orga-
nizational inclusion roughly increases with geographic proximity but also that the sectoral logic
(differentiation of external governance by policy areas) trumps the geographic logic beyond the
EU’s immediate neighborhood. In my own recent attempts at synthesis (Schimmelfennig 2012:
in press), I have looked at how the mechanisms, conditions, and effects of Europeanization vary
across these “concentric circles” and argue that supranational regulation and relevant market size
and dependence are generally the most important conditions of Europeanization beyond the EU.
Relevant market interactions and the material, economic incentives that come with them generate
the need for external actors to adapt to the rules of European governance. But only to the extent
that there is a clearly defined European rule – and one that is centrally decided and hierarchi-
cally enforced – can the EU speak with the necessary unity and authority to the outside world.
The strong impact that the EU has in the quasi-member and candidate countries is predicated
upon the high and asymmetric interdependence with these countries, the substantial incentives
of membership or full market access, and the hierarchical organization of the accession process
as well as the EEA. Relationships with the neighborhood and the rest of the OECD world (e.g.,
the USA) are characterized by weaker and more symmetrical interdependence, weaker incentives,
and a non-hierarchical institutional setting. Whereas the EU cannot impose its entire model in
these relationships, it can still have a Europeanizing impact with regard to specific governance
rules where the conditions of critical market dependence and supranational regulation are present.
Where these are absent, however, the EU’s institutions can merely serve as a model for imitation
or as a socialization agency – with weak Europeanization effects.
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